The indictment of the Milberg Weiss law firm and two of its named partners for allegedly making illegal payments to lead plaintiffs stands at the intersection of important recent developments in both the expanding criminalization of corporate conduct and the federalization of corporate law. Many have noted the irony and hypocrisy of the Milberg firm's alleged use of illegal tactics to prosecute corporate illegality. However, the more important hypocrisy is that Milberg's prosecutors are essentially paying the same witness-Vogel-that Milberg is being prosecuted for paying. This case illustrates the need to develop coherent standards regarding payments to litigants and witnesses. These standards should be based on the incentive effects of the payments rather than on a desire to discourage or encourage particular types of actions.
INTRODUCTION
MUCH ATTENTION HAS FOCUSED LATELY ON TWO IMPORTANT developments in corporate and securities laws. First, there has been increasing federalization of the law in this area. The most notable example is the broad new regulation of internal corporate conduct in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' (SOX). Another example is attempts to control abusive securities class actions by requiring that such actions be brought in federal court.
2 This trend continued recently in the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, ' which expanded the preemptive effect of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 4 The second important development is the increased criminalization of corporate law.' The recent Enron related criminal trials of Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, and the recent criminal investigations of options backdating and other compensation issues illustrate the potentially enormous impact of criminal fraud prosecutions on issues that have traditionally been part of internal corporate governance controlled by state law and civil enforcement. 6 Indeed, this development intersects with federalization. Commentators have noted that prosecutors' use of the mail fraud and RICO statutes to prosecute individuals for depriving another of the intangible right to honest services "stand[s] federalism on its head" by "turning minor state crimes and violations of non-criminal regulations into 20-year federal felonies." 7 The civil and criminal provisions contained in SOX often closely relate to and have the potential to overshadow areas that were traditionally governed by state corporation law. 8 The indictment of the Milberg Weiss law firm and two of its named partners for making and concealing alleged illegal payments to lead plaintiffs stands at the intersection of these important developments. First, the indictment of the leading secur-ities class action law firm has effects that are analogous to recent federal legislation aimed at controlling securities class actions by reducing the viability of private securities class action lawsuits, at least in the short term. 9 Second, this may, in turn, increase the demand for substitutes, including expanded criminal fraud prosecutions. Third, the federal prosecution of Milberg expands the federal role in this area by turning misdemeanor violations of state law and non-criminal violations of ethics laws into federal felonies.
Even more fundamentally, this Article shows that the prosecution of Milberg shares attributes with the "abusive" class action lawsuits targeted by the Milberg prosecution. While many commentators have focused on Milberg's hypocrisy in allegedly using concealed kickbacks to sue firms that engaged in similar behavior, 0 the prosecutor's actions in this case are just as hypocritical. As it has done in many cases, the government used incentive "payments" to induce the cooperation of Howard Vogel in order to prosecute Milberg's incentive payments to Vogel to be a lead plaintiff. The prosecutors' activities therefore facially violate the same statute against paying witnesses that Milberg is being prosecuted for violating. Moreover, these parallels are substantive and not cosmetic. That is, to the extent that payments to lead plaintiffs raise concerns over misaligned incentives, the same concerns can apply a fortiori when used by prosecutors.
The Milberg prosecution illustrates the need for a general policy framework to evaluate when payments to both witnesses and lead plaintiffs should be enjoined. The payment to lead plaintiffs the Milberg prosecution attacks is a potentially efficient practice because it addresses free-riding and incentive problems that would otherwise plague class actions. Making this conduct illegal creates incentives to engage in costly "arbitrage"-that is, roughly equivalent conduct that is legal, or at least involves less detectable illegality. Moreover, perceived social needs to distinguish among underlying rights and wrongs involved in particular causes of action are best met by crafting the cause of action. Trying to accomplish this result by criminalizing litigation behavior may compromise the legitimacy and moral force of the law by making indefensible distinctions between similar types of conduct.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the Milberg indictment and prosecution. Part III examines the effect of incentive payments to lead plaintiffs. Part IV examines payments to witnesses, and contrasts the payments and other considerations paid to Howard Vogel by Milberg with similar considerations given by prosecutors to Vogel and other cooperating defendants such as Andy Fastow in Consol. 1999) . This section provides that commercial bribing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor, and this section states that [a] person is guilty of commercial bribing in the second degree when he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
The activity can be raised to a class E felony under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.03. This section provides that commercial bribing is in the first degree when "the value of the benefit conferred or offered or agreed to be conferred exceeds one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or principal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars."
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false declarations, falsifying tax documents, obstructing of justice, and laundering money. In the final category are "derivative crimes," such as conspiracy, RICO, mail and wire fraud, aiding and abetting, and forfeiture counts. We focus on the substantive acts in the first category. This focus does not imply that the derivative acts are inconsequential and of little social harm. Rather, in our view, they illustrate the serious costs that result from attempts to avoid regulations of payments to witnesses and lead plaintiffs. [tihe share of any final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to a representative party serving on behalf ofa class shall be equal, on a per share basis, to the portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all other members of the class. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the representation of the class to any representative party serving on behalf of a class. Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi), lead plaintiffs must file a sworn certification with the complaint that "states that the plaintiff will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond the plaintiff's pro rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court in accordance with paragraph (4 In addition, both count one (conspiracy) and count two (racketeering conspiracy) of the indictment allege that the payments violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), which prohibits payments to witnesses. 2°T he indictments allege that the payments caused a conflict of interest between the lead plaintiff and the other class members to whom they owed fiduciary duties. In economic terms, the indictment alleges that Milberg's paying of a portion of its attorney's fees to the lead plaintiff increased the agency costs between the lead plaintiff, Milberg, and the class.
2 As a result, the share of fees paid to Milberg and the lead plaintiff out of the common recovery funds increased. 22 Moreover, disclosure of the payments could have affected the certification of the class.
23
Central to the successful indictment was the cooperation of Howard Vogel, who had previously served as a lead plaintiff for Milberg. 24 In late April, 2006, Vogel entered into a plea agreement with the Milberg prosecutors. 25 Pursuant to the plea agreement, Vogel pled guilty to one count of making a false declaration before a court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), agreed to a United States Sentencing Guidelines offense level of seventeen minus a three level decrease for "acceptance of responsibility," 26 and agreed to pay a $2 million dollar fine. The Vogel plea also includes the typical agreement to "cooperate fully ... with respect to any investigations of criminal, civil, disciplinary, or other proceedings relating to any payment 19. Milberg Indictment, supra note 11, 5 29, at 11-12. 20. Id. 41-f, at 26, 5 56-e, at 81. 21. Lead plaintiffs were alleged to have been promised "a substantial portion of the attorney's fees MIL-BERG WEISS obtained in actions in which the individual served, or caused a relative or associate to serve, as named plaintiff for MILBERG WEISS." Id. 5 27, at 10-11.
The paid plaintiffs
had a greater interest in maximizing the amount of attorneys' fees paid to MILBERG WEISS than in maximizing the net recovery to the absent class members and shareholders.... Additionally, MIL-BERG WEISS improperly favored the financial interests of the paid plaintiffs or their spouses or associated entities over the interested class members or shareholders.
Id. 45, at 27-28. 23. Specifically, if the secret payments alter the paid plaintiffs' incentives, the payments may make the paid plaintiff's claims atypical and in conflict with the interests of absent class members. See id. 5 17, at 6-7; see also FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a) (setting out prerequisites to a class action).
24. 26. Id. 14, at 5-6. The base offense level is twelve, with enhancements for substantial interference with the administration of justice (three levels) and abuse of a position of trust (two levels). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.3 (2005) . A level fourteen offense level yields a guidelines sentence of fourteen to twenty-one months for a defendant with the lowest criminal history category. Id. § 5A.l sent. table (1995) .
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made directly or indirectly to any named plaintiff in any class action or shareholder derivative lawsuit brought by the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP."
27 Cooperation requires the defendant to, among other things, "respond truthfully and completely to all questions that may be put to defendant, whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding." 2 The prosecutor agreed not to prosecute certain related offenses, to conditionally notify the court of Vogel's cooperation and substantial assistance, and to move for various sentence reductions. Among other things, the prosecutor agrees "[n]ot to further prosecute defendant for violations of federal law arising out of defendant's conduct [described in the plea agreement]"; to provide written confirmation that the defendant will not be prosecuted for any related criminal tax violations; "if requested by defendant, to bring to the court's attention the nature and extent of defendant's cooperation, in connection with his sentencing"; "[ilf the USAO determines, in its exclusive judgment, that the defendant has both complied with his obligations under [the plea agreement] and provided substantial assistance to law enforcement in the prosecution or investigation of another ("substantial assistance"), to move the Court pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1"; "to fix an offense level and corresponding guideline range below that otherwise advised by the sentencing guidelines"; "to recommend a sentence within this reduced range"; "to recommend that defendant be sentenced to the low-end of defendant's applicable sentencing guidelines range"; and to recommend that "the defendant not be ordered to pay a fine amount higher than the low end of defendant's applicable guideline fine range.
29

III. INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO LEAD PLAINTIFFS
This Part briefly examines the economic function of payments to lead plaintiffs. While the indictment highlights the potential increased agency costs generated by payments to lead plaintiffs, Subpart A shows that any such effect is likely to be de minimus, and thus an implausible explanation for the practice. Subpart B examines alternative explanations for the practices. The point is not to defend Milberg's alleged behavior. For example, even if Milberg did not commit theft, it may have breached fiduciary duties and deprived absent class members of the intangible right to honest services by concealing the payments." However, this only reinforces our point that making the underlying conduct illegal creates incentives to conceal. It then becomes more important to find some rationale for barring the underlying conduct. 
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A. Did the Payments Harm Absent Class Members?
It is far from clear that paying lead plaintiffs harms class members or serves to transfer the proceeds of the common fund to Milberg and the paid lead plaintiff. To see this, consider the division of fees in a common fund class action. Assume that the size of the common fund CF is determined by negotiations between the class counsel and the defendant, and that the defendant is only concerned about the total payout, and not how it is distributed between the members of the class and its counsel. Under these assumptions, whether or not the Milberg payments to the lead plaintiff are disclosed should not affect the outcome of the negotiations to determine CF if the payments do not affect the underlying merits of the case.
3 ' This can be seen by developing a simple model of payments to plaintiffs. Any common fund would be apportioned between the pro-rata class recovery, R, additional recovery for the lead plaintiff, B, and the attorney's fee, F:
In the absence of any expectation of a bonus payment or kickback, the lead plaintiff expects a pro-rata share of the recovery R net of his costs of being the lead plaintiff minus reimbursable reasonable costs and expenses (c -e). Thus,
where N is the number of outstanding affected shares, and k is the number of affected shares owned by the plaintiff. In the absence of the kickbacks, the lead plaintiff's payoff increases as R increases. Now suppose that the lead plaintiff is promised or otherwise expects a bonus, B, equal to a percentage, a, of the fee award F. The lead plaintiffs expected payoff is now
The lead plaintiffs marginal incentives to increase R are now equal to k/N-a < ki N. Moreover, if the plaintiffs pro rata share k/N is small, then the lead plaintiff's payoff will be decreasing in R and increasing in F. Thus, this analysis suggests that a compensated lead plaintiff will sacrifice R in favor of F.
It is unlikely, however, that any such effect is the reason for the payments. The prosecutor's theory assumes that the class representative effectively constrains the fee award given to the lead counsel. In that case, the payments might persuade the plaintiff to consent to higher fees. But as long as k is a small proportion of N, the lead plaintiff has little incentive to increase R. Indeed, one of the reasons for the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA was to attempt to replace such ineffective non-institutional lead plaintiffs with larger institutional lead plaintiffs.
2 Thus, it is 31. This assumption would not hold if disclosure of the payments to the lead plaintiff lowered the probability that the class would be certified, which should reduce CF. Thus, with respect to the size of the common fund, non-disclosure of the payments should not harm absent class members.
32. 
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not clear that the payments to non-institutional lead plaintiffs such as Vogel effectively increased agency costs or caused any economic harm to the absent class members.
Moreover, the prosecutor's theory does not take into account the fact that the size of the attorney's fee must be approved by the judge presiding over the case, and that the size of the attorney's fee award in such cases depends mainly on the client's recovery. 33 Eisenberg & Miller found that the "dominance of the client's recovery as a determinant of the fee is nearly complete," and that the "relation between fees and recovery is remarkably linear on a log scale." 34 The size of the award dominates effort or cost-based measures such as the lodestar in explaining fee awards. They also do not find that the presence of objectors to the fee award has any discernable effect on the size of the award, or any decrease in fees in securities class actions after the PSLRA was enacted.
5
These findings suggest that judges mainly base attorneys' fee awards on a percentage of the recovery, with the percentage p determined by a standard sliding scale. Under the assumption that the judge fixes p based on the characteristics of the recovery, a non-compensated lead plaintiff will expect to recover
By contrast, a lead plaintiff that expects to be paid an additional bonus equal to aF would expect to recover
Comparing LP 3 and LP 2 , compensating the lead plaintiff increases the lead plaintiffs incentive to raise R because a higher R produces a higher F and therefore a higher bonus. Thus, under these assumptions, paying the lead plaintiffs a portion of the attorney's fees would not result in lower recoveries by absent class members. Rather, the class attorney would internalize the cost of the payment to the lead plaintiff.
B. Why Lead Plaintiffs?
If payments of a portion of the attorney's legal fees are not being used to transfer a larger portion of a fixed common fund to the lawyer and lead plaintiff, why would the lawyer and lead plaintiff agree to such payments? In this section, we show that such payments can serve to reduce agency costs, solve collective action problems, and increase the recovery of class members. Rather than viewing the payments as a way to enact wealth transfers in a zero-sum game, we show that such payments can be used to increase the payoff to class members by increasing the probability that 
35.
Id. at 66-68.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
viable actions are filed in the first place.
6 Thus, in contrast to the theory contained in the Milberg indictment that these payments facilitate self-interested behavior by class counsel, payments to lead plaintiffs can be used to reduce, rather than increase, agency costs. If so, these payments can increase the expected recovery by absent class members.
There are several reasons why incentive awards to class plaintiffs may be efficient.
7 First, bonus payments can solve free-rider and collective action problems. Class members rationally will refuse to serve as lead plaintiffs if they are limited to a pro-rata share of the net recovery. Their non-reimbursable costs can outweigh any expected pro-rata recovery, so that LP < 0. More importantly, even if LP° > 0, the class member will be better off by (c -e) as long as someone else serves as the lead plaintiff. This free-rider problem and the resulting difficulty in finding a suitable lead plaintiff can prevent the filing of some class action lawsuits.
Payments to lead plaintiffs can mitigate these free-riding and collective action problems by, for example, reimbursing lead plaintiffs for non-pecuniary litigation costs. Even if these payments cause increased agency costs between the lead plaintiff and absent class members, class members are better off if solving the free-rider problem leads to more actions being filed.
3 " Bonus payments can also reduce agency costs by rewarding class representatives for superior service, thus inducing the lead plaintiff to take actions that increase the probability and size of the class recovery. Payments can also achieve proportionality between awards and other outcomes, such as costs or attorney's fees.
Eisenberg & Miller's empirical study of court-granted bonus awards to lead plaintiffs in class actions finds little support for the attorney self-interest explanation of payments to lead plaintiffs. In contrast, they find evidence consistent with using these payments to solve the collective action and free-rider problems, by reimbursing lead plaintiffs for non-pecuniary costs.
39 Eisenberg & Miller also find a strong association between lead plaintiff bonus awards and the size of the class 36. Moreover, payments that induce the filing of class action lawsuits can be socially productive even if the payments redistribute a portion of the recovery from absent class members to the lead plaintiff and class counsel. See, e.g 38. Consistent with this hypothesis, one of the lawsuit deterring features of the PSLRA is to prevent the payment of bonuses to lead plaintiffs. See 15 U.S.C. § 78v-4(a)(2)(a)(vi) (2006). 39. For example, Eisenberg & Miller find frequent use of bonus awards in cases where average recoveries are low (e.g., consumer credit cases), which is consistent with a desire to ensure that the lead plaintiff does not incur a net loss as a result of his service to the class. In addition, the large incentive awards observed in employment discrimination cases, which exhibit high average recoveries, are consistent with compensating such plaintiffs for the risk of retaliation from their employers. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 37, at 1308, 1324-25.
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recovery, attorney's fee and expenses awarded in settlement." Thus, court-awarded bonus payments have a structure similar to those used by Milberg to pay Vogel and the other paid plaintiffs.
The prior analysis shows how payments to class plaintiffs can benefit class plaintiffs by reducing agency costs. However, court-awarded bonus payments are not allowed in post-PSLRA securities cases. Milberg allegedly used direct payments even in pre-PSLRA cases, perhaps because court awards in securities cases were insufficient or too uncertain to solve the free-riding and collective action problems.' In any event, legislative or judicial rules preventing sufficient awards clearly increase lawyers' incentives to engage in illegal behavior in order to solve the free-rider problem with lead plaintiffs. The illegality of this behavior, in turn, triggers efforts to conceal the payments and the demand for more remedies, including federal criminal sanctions, to prevent such arbitrage."
IV. PAYING WITNESSES
The analysis in the prior section shows that the prosecutor's theory of harm to absent class action members is implausible. Moreover, there are plausible efficiency reasons for making payments to lead plaintiffs. However, there may be other costs to allowing payments to litigants. For example, allowing the payments may create an appearance of impropriety by compromising the integrity of the participants and thereby reduce the normative force of law.
Indeed, the indictment alleges that Milberg violated a federal bribery statute that does not require that the payments were made for corrupt purposes. In counts one and two of the indictment, the defendants are alleged to have agreed Clearly, the law requires only the appearance of corruption, and not that such payments were made corruptly or with intent to influence the testimony.
to make illegal payments to a witness by giving, offering, and promising money to the Paid Plaintiffs, for and because of the testimony under oath of affirmation given and to be given by the Paid Plaintiffs as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding before a court authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony in the Lawsuits
44
This statute is of interest for two main reasons. First, it is the only federal criminal statute cited in the Milberg indictment that directly regulates the substantive conduct involved in the Milberg case. Moreover, since application of the statute does not require that the payments were made with bad intent or were concealed, if the statute applies to the Milberg case it would also preclude disclosed payments to lead plaintiffs even in the absence of other criminal, civil or ethical prohibitions against such payment.
Second, the statute facially applies to the U.S. Attorney's promises contained in the Vogel plea agreement. Thus, this suggests that if 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) applies to Milberg's payments to Vogel, it might also apply to the federal prosecutor's plea agreement with Vogel. 45 The issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) applies to the standard practice of giving leniency in exchange for testimony was addressed in United States v. Single-43. See Milberg Indictment, supra note 11, 5 41, at 25-26. 44. Such corrupt payments to witnesses could be charged under similarly structured IS U.S.C. § 201(b)(3), which subjects the violator to greater punishment. This section reads as [wihoever . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such person to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to influence the testimony under oath or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent himself therefrom . . . shall be fined under this title for not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) would be punished under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.3, which has a base offense level of fourteen. In contrast, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) would be punished under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.9, which has a base offense level of six.
45. J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness, Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but not the Defense?, 11 CRIM. JUST. 20 (1997) .
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ton (Singleton I).46 In this case, the defendant, Sonya Singleton, was convicted at trial for one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and seven counts of money laundering. Central to the prosecution's case was the testimony of Napoleon Douglas, who testified against Singleton at trial. Like Vogel in Milberg, Douglas had entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in exchange for leniency. Specifically, in "consideration" of his promise to testify truthfully in federal and/or state court, the prosecutor promised that Douglas would not be prosecuted "for any other violations of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act stemming from his activities currently under investigation, except perjury or related offenses," and that he would advise both the Mississippi parole board and the sentencing court, prior to sentencing, of the nature and extent of the cooperation provided by Mr. Douglas. 47 Singleton's attorney argued on appeal that the conviction should be overturned because of the district court's refusal to exclude the testimony of Douglas, which was obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) and the Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b).
8
In a decision that was described as a "bombshell" and the "new Miranda," 9 the panel in Singleton I reversed the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial, ordering the exclusion of Douglas' testimony. The panel found that the term "whoever," and thus the statute, applied to U.S. Attorneys, holding that the prosecutor's actions did not fall within the limited set of circumstances recognized by the Supreme Court where statutes do not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text expressly includes the government." 0 Specifically, the panel noted that while statutes "which would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest" would imply a government exception, the exception did not apply "where the operation of the law is upon the agents or servants of the government rather than on the sovereign itself' or when the "statute's purpose is to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong."" Thus, the term "whoever" included prosecutors because prosecutors were agents of the government, and because the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) was to prevent the "wrong" of bribery.
The court also rejected a second reason for a government exception-that the statute would create an absurdity if applied to the government. The court found that "the statute's application to government officials, far from being absurd, is at 46. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998 ), rev'd en banr, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999 the center of our legal tradition." The court noted the payments for testimony were not necessary because "[e]very citizen has the legal duty to testify to facts within his knowledge, and any witness may be compelled to do so by subpoena and civil contempt proceedings." 2 The court also noted that the "judicial process is tainted and justice cheapened when factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money. Because prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to do justice and observe the law in the course of a prosecution, it is particularly appropriate to apply the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to their activities." 3 The reaction to the Singleton I decision was swift. The decision led to a flood of similar challenges and appeals. But these challenges were met with a near unanimous rejection of Singleton I's holding. 4 Moreover, because the decision threatened to jeopardize numerous previous convictions and ongoing prosecutions, the Tenth Circuit agreed to vacate the panel's decision ten days after the opinion was issued, and agreed to hear the case en banc. In a 9-3 decision, the en banc court in Singleton II affirmed the convictions, with seven judges holding that the word "whoever" does not include the United States acting in its sovereign capacity, and thus does not include an Assistant United States Attorney acting as the alter ego of the United States in offering leniency to a criminal accomplice in exchange for truthful testimony.
5 Further, because the "ingrained practice of granting lenience in exchange for testimony has created a vested sovereign prerogative in the government," applying the statute to the government would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established prerogative, title, or interest. REV. 563 (1999) . The federal government also has set up specific reward and punishment systems to encourage reporting of wrongdoing and, in some cases, the filing of lawsuits. See, e.g 
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Critics have described Singleton II as "very result oriented" and noted the court's "strained" interpretation of the term "whoever."" 7 Even those who might agree with the outcome note that any such modification should have been left to the legislature." Indeed, many of the post-Singleton II analyses find merit in Judge Lucero's concurrence.
9 Judge Lucero rejected the majority's strained interpretation of the term "whoever" and agreed with the panel that the term included the U.S. Attorney.'° Lucero noted that the majority's definitions would imply the obvious absurdity that the prosecutor could pay cash, or even violate the identically structured 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3). 6 Lucero emphasized instead that application of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) Where specific statutes conflicted with the general prohibitions of § 201(c)(2), Judge Lucero reasoned that the specific statutes should control.
6 " A more serious examination of § 201(c)(2) and conflicting statutes suggests some principles for discerning the scope and limits of such a statute. For example, exceptions to the prohibition of witness payments under § 201(c)(2) could be allowed where the testimony could not otherwise be compelled. For example, the immunity statute allows removal of a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege, restoring the prosecutor's ability to compel the testimony. Similarly, the exception contained in 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) that allows the payment of a reasonable fee paid in exchange for expert testimony 6 also applies to a setting where admissible testimony could not otherwise be compelled. 67 This would distinguish the immunity statute and payments to experts from payments to witnesses that could be legally compelled to testify. Moreover, the apparent conflicts with the provisions of the sentencing guidelines provisions for downward departures under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1, and the plea provision of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e), suggest the need for court supervision of any deals, and may differentiate leniency in sentencing from promises not to prosecute.6
The major problem with Singleton II's alter ego analysis is the absence of any type of substantive analysis of the practice and possible conflicts.
69 This is especially problematic given that the court's alter ego analysis is only a judicially created and ad hoc public policy exception to § 201(c)(2). For example, the Singleton II majority suggests that payment of cash for testimony would bring the prosecutor under § 201(c)(2) because the prosecutor "who offers something other than a concession normally granted by the government," such as paying cash or bribing a witness to 65. See id. at 1303 ("Whereas the majority considers these statutes to be unnecessary to its result, see Maj. Op. at 1302, 1 find them dispositive.").
18 U.S.C. § 201(d) provides:
[p]aragraph ... (2) . .. of subsection (c) shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying.
67. In the normal case, an expert witness's opinion testimony will require the expert to undertake effort in order to meet the admissibility standards set out for such testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Thus, an expert's admissible opinion testimony differs from an ordinary witness's lay testimony as to facts within his knowledge. Moreover, the ability of such testimony is highly regulated by the trial court. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (expanding the trial judge's gatekeeping role in determining whether such expert testimony meets the standards for admissibility under Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 702, and 703).
68. See United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (noting the importance ofjudge intermediation); see also Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1303 (noting promises not to prosecute are not in exchange for testimony, but rather in consideration for a plea of guilty (and the avoidance of trial and other costs) to the six counts).
69. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1302 (noting that "[wie simply believe the general principles we have set forth so completely undercut defendant's reading that further exposition would be redundant").
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provide false testimony, would no longer be "the alter ego of the sovereign and is divested of the protective mantle of the government."" But, Singleton II provides no guidance to determine when these normal conditions exist, or what, if any, limits are placed on prosecutors' behavior.
7 Indeed, some federal appeals courts have allowed prosecutors and law enforcement officers to pay witnesses cash in exchange for testimony.
7
A serious analysis also would facilitate a more general discussion of the consequences of a rule barring prosecutors from buying testimony, and thus help in analyzing what limits should be placed on prosecutors offering inducements in exchange for testimony. Many of the post-Singleton II analyses focus on the imbalance in favor of the prosecutor. Commentators have suggested legislative reforms that would address this imbalance, including the mutual application or repeal of § 201(c)(2)," limiting the prosecutor's ability to make contingent plea agreements, 74 or increasing judicial oversight of prosecutors.
There has also been criticism of Singleton L7 In its concern over the costs of false convictions, that opinion may not have properly balanced the costs of letting guilty defendants go free. Witnesses may face significant disincentives, including social stigma or fear of extralegal punishment or retribution, which justifies paying them for testimony. 76 But as noted in the many commentaries following the Singleton decisions, any considerations that apply to the prosecutor would also apply to use 70. Id. at 1307. 71. From a policy standpoint, the primary issue is not about the power of government but about the need to discipline agency costs within the government, just as those between class lawyers and the class. Recent actions and controversies illustrate that government agency costs may be as serious as agency costs between class counsel and the class. A notable example is the government's use of discretion in charging an accounting firm to effectively coerce cooperation by its employees by denying them the funds necessary for their defense. REV. 7 (1999) .
76. Thus, on public policy grounds, payments or things of value could be given when there is a de facto as well as a de jure impediment to the ordinary ability to compel a witness to testify. These considerations would allow 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) to be reconciled with the Witness Relocation and Protection Act, which allows the government to give benefits for the protection of government witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § § 3521-28 (2000) .
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of payments by the defense. Most importantly for present purposes, these considerations would also apply to the use of witness payments by Milberg. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, for this reason it is far from clear that such payments would be prohibited.
77
On the other hand, despite the "doomsday" rhetoric, it is far from clear that Singleton I would have resulted in much prospective harm to prosecutors. One possibility is that the court's approach may not stop the practice of leniency for testimony, but rather make such promises implicit rather than explicit. 7 " Indeed, under this system, the prosecutors or even defense attorneys could simply inform defendants of the probable outcomes of their actions, including leniency by the judge at sentencing. 79 Such an outcome would reduce both judicial oversight and the fairness of the process to defendants. For example, the accomplice witness, when asked in court, could truthfully respond that he was not given consideration in exchange for testimony, even when all parties expect this to be the case ex post."°S uch concerns are not speculative. For example, during the Enron trial, the star witness for the prosecution was Andrew Fastow, who previously pled guilty to two counts of wire fraud and agreed that his "guidelines sentence would include 120 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons." 8 had no chance of a better deal for his testimony.
2 Fastow's claim that he was testifying as a non-contingent witness certainly would be a key factor in the jury's credibility assessment of him as a witness.
83 However, at sentencing, Fastow, in would be exacerbated by a rule that prohibited paying witnesses. s7 If the court can not effectively supervise the giving of implicit deals, then there is not much difference between the prosecutor's actions and Milberg's payments to witnesses based on disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators on the Milberg case have noted the irony and hypocrisy involved in the case. However, the primary hypocrisy in this case is not the fact that Milberg "prosecuted" many firms for engaging in "kickbacks" and concealing information.
Rather, the important hypocrisy is the fact that the prosecution seeks to prosecute Milberg for paying witnesses while simultaneously using the same conduct, indeed to the same person, to prosecute Milberg. This case illustrates the need to reconsider standards regarding incentive payments to litigants and witnesses. Any such standard should be based upon analysis of the incentive effects of the payments, and not based on a desire to encourage criminal actions or to discourage civil actions. Indeed, it may be rational not to apply 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) to prosecutors. But the same considerations would apply to the application of this statute to defendants and their lawyers, as well as to evaluating restrictions on payments to lead plaintiffs.
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87. In the alternative, one could argue that the sentencing court in the Fastow case was the one who exhibited "mercy" by giving him a six year sentence. Of course, one could also say that the federal court in a class action controlled the attorney's fees.
